Perceptual organization is the process of grouping scene elements into whole entities, for example line segments into contours. Uncertainty in grouping arises from scene ambiguity and sensory noise. Some classic Gestalt principles of perceptual organization have been re-framed in terms of Bayesian models, whereby the observer computes the probability that the whole entity is present. Previous studies that proposed a Bayesian interpretation of perceptual organization, however, have ignored sensory uncertainty, despite the fact that accounting for the current level of uncertainty is the main signature of Bayesian decision making. Crucially, trial-by-trial manipulation of sensory uncertainty is necessary to test whether humans perform optimal Bayesian inference in perceptual organization, as opposed to using some non-Bayesian heuristic. We distinguish between these hypotheses in an elementary form of perceptual organization, namely judging whether two line segments separated by an occluder are collinear. We manipulate sensory uncertainty by varying retinal eccentricity. A Bayes-optimal observer would take the level of sensory uncertainty into account -in a very specific way -in deciding whether a measured offset between the line segments is due to non-collinearity or to sensory noise. We find that people deviate slightly but systematically from Bayesian optimality, while still performing "probabilistic computation" in the sense that they take into account sensory uncertainty via a heuristic rule. Our work contributes to an understanding of the role of sensory uncertainty in higher-order perception.
Author summary
Our percept of the world is governed not only by the sensory information we have access to, but also by the way we interpret this information. When presented with a visual scene, our visual system undergoes a process of grouping visual elements together to form coherent entities so that we can interpret the scene more readily and meaningfully. For example, when looking at a pile of autumn leaves, one can still perceive and identify a whole leaf even when it is partially covered by another leaf. While Gestalt psychologists have long described perceptual organization with a set of qualitative laws, recent studies offered a statistically-optimal -Bayesian, in statistical jargoninterpretation of this process, whereby the observer chooses the scene configuration with
Perceptual organization is the process whereby the brain integrates primitive elements 2 of a visual scene into whole entities. Typically, the same scene could afford different 3 interpretations because of ambiguity and perceptual noise. How the brain singles out 4 one interpretation has long been described to follow a set of qualitative principles 5 defined in Gestalt psychology. For example, contour integration, a form of perceptual 6 organization that consists of the perceptual grouping of distinct line elements into a 7 single continuous contour, is often described by the Gestalt principles of "good 8 continuation" and "proximity". They state that humans extrapolate reasonable object 9 boundaries by grouping local contours consistent with a smooth global structure [1] . 10 While Gestalt principles represent a useful catalogue of well-established perceptual 11 phenomena, they lack a theoretical basis, cannot make quantitative predictions, and are 12 agnostic with respect to uncertainty arising from sensory noise. This not only limits 13 understanding at the psychological level, it is also problematic within a broader agenda 14 of quantitatively linking neural activity in different brain areas to behavior. For 15 example, neural investigations of the perception of illusory contours, a perceptual 16 organization phenomenon in which the observer perceives object contours when they are 17 not physically present, have largely remained at a qualitative level. An alternative 18 approach that does not suffer from these shortcomings uses the framework of Bayesian 19 inference, whereby the observer computes the probabilities of possible world states given 20 sensory observations using Bayes' rule [2] . In the realm of perceptual organization, 21 Bayesian models stipulate that the observer computes the probabilities of different 22 hypotheses about which elements belong to the same object (e.g., [3] [4] [5] [6] ). For the 23 example of contour integration, such hypotheses would be that line elements belong to 24 the same contour and that they belong to different contours. 25 A fully Bayesian approach to perceptual organization would provide a normative 26 way for dealing both with high-level uncertainty arising from ambiguity in the latent 27 structure of the scene, and with low-level (sensory) uncertainty arising from noise in 28 measuring primitive elements of the scene. Crucially, however, previous studies in 29 perceptual organization have not examined whether the decision rule adapts flexibly as 30 function of sensory uncertainty. Such adaptation is a form of probabilistic computation 31 and is one of the basic signatures of Bayesian optimality [7] . This question is 32 fundamental to understanding whether, how, and to which extent the brain represents 33 and computes with probability distributions [8] . A trial-by-trial manipulation of sensory 34 uncertainty is a necessary test of probabilistic computation, because otherwise Bayesian 35 inference would be indistinguishable from an observer using an inflexible, 36 uncertainty-independent mapping [9, 10] . Indeed, manipulation of sensory uncertainty 37 has been a successful approach for studying probabilistic computation in low-level 38 perception, such as in multisensory cue combination [11, 12] and in integration of 39 sensory measurements with prior expectations [13, 14] . Moreover, tasks with varying uncertainty have yielded insights into the neural representation of uncertainty [15, 16] .
41
In the current study, we investigate the effect of varying sensory uncertainty on an suggesting a form of sub-optimality in the decision-making process. Our study paves the 59 way for a combined understanding of how different sources of uncertainty affect 60 perceptual organization.
61

Results
62
Subjects (n = 8) performed a collinearity judgment task ( Fig 1A) . On each trial, the 
66
To avoid the learning of a fixed mapping, we withheld correctness feedback. In different 67 blocks in the same sessions, participants also completed a height judgment task (Fig 1B) , 68 with the purpose of providing us with an independent estimate of the participants' 69 sensory noise. In both tasks, sensory uncertainty was manipulated by varying retinal 70 eccentricity on a trial to trial basis ( Fig 1D) . We investigated whether people took into 71 account their sensory noise σ x (y), which varied with eccentricity level y, when deciding 72 collinearity.
73
We found a main effect of vertical offset on the proportion of collinearity reports
74
(two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction; (Fig 2A,B) . We also found a significant interaction between 78 offset and eccentricity (F (4.38,30.7) = 7.88, = 0.183, p < 0.001, η 2 p = 0.529), which is 79 evident in the psychometric curves across subjects (Fig 2C) .
80
We did not find significant effects of learning across sessions (see S1 Appendix), so in 81 our analyses for each subject we pooled data from all sessions.
82
Models
83
We describe here three main observer models which correspond to different assumptions 84 with respect to when the observer reports "collinear", that is three different forms of 85 decision boundaries (Fig 3) .
86
We first consider the behavior of a Bayes-optimal observer ("Bayes") who utilizes 87 the probability distributions defined in the generative model (Fig 1C) On a given trial, the stimulus pair y L , y R randomly appeared around one of four eccentricity levels (y = 0, 4.8, 9.6, and16.8), measured by degrees of visual angle (dva). For all models, the observer's measurements x L , x R are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution centered on the true stimulus y L , y R , respectively, with standard deviation σ x (y) dependent on eccentricity level y. D: Possible eccentricity levels (in dva). E: Stimulus distribution for collinearity judgment task. When C = 1, the vertical position of the left line segment y L is drawn from a Gaussian distribution centered at y with fixed standard deviation. The vertical position of the right segment y R is then made equal to y L . When C = 0, y L and y R are independently drawn from the same Gaussian.
that maximize the probability of being correct, given the available sensory deciding whether a measured offset between the line segments is due to non-collinearity 91 or to sensory noise by choosing the category (C = 1 or C = 0) with the highest posterior 92 probability p(C|x L , x R ), where x L , x R are measurements of the two line segments on a 93 particular trial. This strategy translates into reporting "collinear" when x L , x R fall 94 within the optimal decision boundary, which is a function of (a) both measurements -95 not simply their difference -, (b) sensory noise (that is, eccentricity) in the trial, and (c) 96 the prior belief about the proportion of collinear trials p(C = 1) (Fig 3B) . Note that a 97 strictly optimal observer would have a prior that matches the experimental distribution, 98 p(C = 1) = 0.5. Here we relaxed the assumption and allowed p(C = 1) to be a free and linear heuristic (Lin) models (left to right). The probability of reporting "collinear" given stimulus and eccentricity condition is equal to the probability that the observer's measurements of vertical positions of left and right line segments fall within the boundary defined by the model.
To investigate whether people apply instead a learned stimulus mapping that is
102 uncertainty independent, we tested a fixed-criterion model ("Fixed") in which the 103 observer responds that two line segments are collinear whenever the measured offset 104 |x L − x R | is less than a fixed distance κ (a free parameter of the model). This
105
corresponds to an eccentricity-invariant decision boundary ( Fig 3A) . account in a simple, linear way: the observer responds "collinear" whenever the 109 measured offset |x L − x R | is less than an uncertainty-dependent criterion,
where κ 0 and κ 1 are free parameters of the model (Fig 3C) .
111
Model comparison
112
To fully account for parameter uncertainty, we used Markov Chain Monte Carlo
113
(MCMC) to sample the posterior distributions of the parameters for each model and 114 individual subject. To estimate goodness of fit (that is, predictive accuracy) while 115 taking into account model complexity, we compared models using the leave-one-out 116 cross-validation score (LOO), estimated on a subject-by-subject basis directly from the 117 MCMC posterior samples via Pareto smoothed importance sampling [22] . Higher LOO 118 scores correspond to better predictive accuracy and, thus, better models.
119
We found that the fixed-criterion model fits the worst
120
(LOO Bayes − LOO Fixed = 25.6 ± 13.6, LOO Lin − LOO Fixed = 69.3 ± 16.5; Mean ± SEM 121 across subjects), while also yielding the poorest qualitative fits to the behavioral data
122
( Fig 4A) . This result suggests that participants used not only their measurements but 123 also sensory uncertainty from trial to trial, thus providing first evidence for probabilistic 124 computation in collinearity judgment. Moreover, we find that the linear heuristic model 125 performs better than the Bayesian model (LOO Lin − LOO Bayes = 43.7 ± 13.3),
126
suggestive of a suboptimal way of taking uncertainty into account.
127
To allow for model heterogeneity across subjects, we also combined model evidence 128 from different subjects using a hierarchical Bayesian approach that treats the model as 129 a random variable to accommodate between-subject random effects [23] . This method 130 allowed us to compute the expected posterior frequency for each model, that is the 131 probability that a randomly chosen subject belongs to a particular model in the protected exceedance probability [24] , that is the probability that a particular model is 136 the most frequent model in the set, above and beyond chance. We found consistent 137 results -namely the Fixed model has the lowest protected exceedance probability 138 (0.048), followed by Bayes (0.062), and Lin (0.89).
139
Validation of noise parameters
140
In all analyses so far, the observer's sensory noise levels at each eccentricity level σ x (y) 141 were individually fitted as free parameters (four noise parameters, one per eccentricity 142 level). To obtain an independent estimate of the subjects' noise, and thus verify if the 143 noise parameters estimated from the collinearity task data truly capture subjects' 144 sensory noise, we introduced in the same sessions an independent Vernier discrimination 145 task (height judgment task) [25, 26] . In this task, participants judged whether the right 146 line segment was displaced above or below the left line segment (Fig 1B and Fig 5A) .
147
Importantly, the observer's optimal decision rule in this task is based solely on the sign 148 of the observer's measured offset between the line segments, and does not depend on 149 sensory noise (that is, respond "right segment higher" whenever x R > x L ). Moreover, 150 trials in this task matched the stimulus statistics used in non-collinear trials of the 151 collinearity judgment task. Therefore, the height judgment task afforded an 152 independent set of estimates of subjects' noise levels. their performance was also affected simultaneously by offset and eccentricity (that is, 160 sensory noise).
161
We found that sensory noise parameters estimated from the best model (Lin) in the 162 collinearity task were well correlated -across subjects and eccentricities -with those 163 estimated from the height judgment task (r = 0.87) (Fig 5B) , indicating that the model 164 is correctly capturing subjects' noise characteristics in collinearity judgment.
165
We next examined whether the model comparison between Bayes, Fixed, and Lin 166 could be constrained using the parameter estimates obtained from the height judgment 167 task, and whether such a constrained comparison would alter our findings. For each 168 subject and each eccentricity level, we imported the maximum-a-posteriori noise 169 parameter of that subject at that eccentricity level, as estimated from the height 170 judgment task, into the model for the collinearity task. This left the Bayes, Fixed, and 171 Lin models with only 2, 2, and 3 parameters, respectively, which we estimated via 172 MCMC as previously described. The fits of the constrained models were comparable to 173 those of their unconstrained counterparts (compare Fig 5C to 4A) . The quantitative correctly captured subjects' noise features, and that our conclusions are not merely due 178 to excessive flexibility of our models, as we obtain the same results with models with 179 very few free parameters.
180
Suboptimality analysis
181
In the previous sections we have found that the Lin model wins the model comparison 182 against the Bayes-optimal model, suggestive of suboptimal behavior among participants. 183 Here we closely examine the degree of suboptimality in terms of the loss of accuracy in 184
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the collinearity task with respect to Bayesian optimal behavior.
185
In order to assess the accuracy that an observer with a given set of noise parameters 186 could achieve, had they performed Bayes-optimally, we proceeded as follows. For each 187 subject, we generated a simulated dataset from the Bayes-optimal model using the 188 maximum-a-posteriori noise parameters σ x (y) estimated from both the collinearity 189 judgment task and the height judgment task. We used both estimates to ensure that 190 our results did not depend on a specific way of estimating noise parameters. For this 191 analysis, we assumed optimal parameters, that is p common = 0.5 and no lapse (λ = 0).
192
We found a significant difference between observed accuracy and estimated optimal 193 accuracy based on collinearity judgment noise, as shown in Fig 6 (two-way   194 repeated-measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction; F (1.00,7.00) = 37.8, However, a statistically significant difference does not necessarily imply a substantial 207 difference in terms of performance, as previous studies have shown that participants can 208 be "optimally lazy" by deviating from optimal performance in a way that has minimal 209 impact on overall expected score in a task [27] . We quantified our subjects' performance 210 in terms of efficiency, that is the proportion of correct responses with respect to optimal 211 behavior. Our subjects exhibited an overall efficiency of 0.953 ± 0.007 (based on 212 collinearity judgment noise), or 0.959 ± 0.015 (based on height judgement noise), which 213 suggests that our subjects were only slightly suboptimal (see Discussion).
214
Observed accuracy Accuracy if optimal (Collinearity judgement noise)
Accuracy if optimal (Height judgement noise) Fig 6 . Suboptimality analysis. Black line: Observed accuracy across four eccentricity levels (chance probability = 0.5). Error bars indicate Mean ± 1 SEM across subjects. Green line: Estimated accuracy if subjects perform Bayes-optimally, with noise parameters obtained via the collinearity judgement task. Blue line: Estimated accuracy with noise parameters obtained via the height judgment task. Performance was slightly suboptimal across participants.
Model variants
215
We consider here several alternative observer models that relax some key assumptions 216 we made when constructing our main observers, to verify whether our findings still hold. 217 
Mismatch of noise parameters
218
So far, we have assumed that observers utilize directly their noise parameters σ x (y) 219 when computing the decision rule. Here we propose a variant of the Bayes-optimal 220 model, "Mismatch", in which the observer instead uses a set of assumed noise 221 parameters that may deviate from the true standard deviations of their measurement 222 distributions [28] . This model is identical to the Bayes-optimal model except that all 223 four σ x (y) are substituted with σ x,assumed (y), the assumed noise parameters, in the 224 calculation of the decision variables. To limit model complexity, we chose for the 225 assumed noise parameters a parametric form which is a linear function of the true noise 226 parameters σ x (y). To avoid issues of lack of parameter identifiability [29] , for the 227 Mismatch model we also fixed p common = 0.5. Thus, the Mismatch model has the same 228 number of free parameters as Lin, and one more than Bayes.
229
After relaxing the Bayes-optimal model to allow for assumed noise parameters, we results suggest that a degree of suboptimality in the observers might have arisen from a 236 lack of knowledge of their own noise characteristics [28] , but such mismatch is not 237 enough to entirely explain the observed pattern of behavior.
238
Trial dependency
239
We also tested for potential influence of stimulus uncertainty from previous trials
240
("History" model) on the response of the current trial. Specifically, for the History 241 model we extended the formula of the decision boundary of the Lin model to be a linear 242 function of the noise parameters of the current trial, as before, plus the noise associated 243 with up to four previous trials, that is σ x (y t ),σ x (y t−1 ),σ x (y t−2 ),σ x (y t−3 ),σ x (y t−4 ), 244 respectively, each one with a separate weight.
245
We found no evidence of trial dependency, for the History model fits about as well or 246 even slightly worse than Lin (LOO History − LOO Lin = −2.4 ± 0.24). In particular, we 247 also found that the maximum-a-posteriori weights associated with σ x (y t−1 ) to σ x (y t−4 ) 248 were all not significantly different from zero across participants (respectively, t (7) = 1.45, 249 p = 0.19; t (7) = 0.0754, p = 0.94; t (7) = −1.18, p = 0.28; t (7) = −1.27, p = 0.24). These 250 results show that sensory uncertainty from previous trials had no effect on the observers' 251 decision in the current trial.
252
Nonparametric examination
253
In the Lin model (and variants thereof), so far we assumed a linear parametric 254 relationship between the decision boundary and the noise level σ x (y), as per Eq 1.
255
Here we loosened this constraint and fitted the decision boundary for each 256 eccentricity level as an individual parameter. Due to its flexible nature, we consider this 257 "Nonparametric" model merely as a descriptive model, which we expect to explain the 258 data very well. We use the Nonparametric model as a means to provide an upper-bound 259 on the LOO score for each individual, so as to have an absolute metric to evaluate the 260 performances of other models (in a spirit similarly to estimating the entropy of the data, 261 that is an estimate of the intrinsic variability of the data which represents an upper 262 bound on the performance of any model [30] 
268
We can also use the Nonparametric model to examine how close the parametric 269 estimates of decision boundary from Lin, our best model so far, are to those obtained 270 nonparametrically. We observed that the average decision boundary across 8 subjects, 271 as a function of eccentricity, was consistent with the average nonparametric estimates of 272 the decision boundary at every eccentricity level (Fig 7A,B) . This agreement means that 273 the decision boundaries adopted by observers in the task were, indeed, approximately 274 linear in the eccentricity levels, as assumed by the linear heuristic model. 
Discussion
276
To study how people group together elements of a visual scene, we designed a 277 behavioral experiment in which participants were asked to judge whether two line 278 segments partially occluded belonged to the same line. Using computational observer 279 models to describe the obtained data, we found that people utilize sensory uncertainty 280 when making collinearity judgements, however in a slightly suboptimal way. Crucially, 281 our results are robust to changes in model assumptions, such as noise model mismatch, 282 history effects, and different decision boundaries, and we independently validated our 283 parameter estimates in a different task. With trial-by-trial manipulation of eccentricity 284 in a collinearity judgment task, our study presents the first rigorous examination of the 285 role of sensory uncertainty for probabilistic computations in perceptual organization.
286
The present study is linked to the broader effort to study hierarchical Bayesian 287 inference in perception, whereby the observer is required to marginalize over stimulus 288 values (here, line offset) to build a posterior over latent, discrete causal scenarios (here, 289 same line of different lines). Such framework was adopted and tested in a variety of 290 domains such as cue combination [31] , change detection [32] , perception of sameness [33] , 291 and causal inference [34] . In particular, our models share the same formal structure of 292 models of causal inference in multisensory perception [34, 35] . In such tasks, the 293 observer receives sensory measurements of possibly discrepant cues from distinct sensory 294 modalities (e.g., vision and hearing), and has to infer whether the cues originated from 295 the same source (C = 1) or from different sources (C = 0) -leading to, respectively, cue 296 integration and cue segregation. Previous work has shown that Bayesian causal inference 297 models provide a good qualitative description of human performance in multisensory 298 perception with discrepant cues, but quantitative comparison hints at deviations from 299 exact Bayesian behavior [30] , not unlike what we find here. Our study differs from 300 previous work in that here we focus on an atomic form of perceptual organization.
301
While in our study we closely examined the effect of varying sensory uncertainty, our 302 task did not strictly introduce ambiguity, a integral element of Gestalt perception.
303
Ambiguity translates to overlapping stimulus distributions, and ambiguous trials are 304 only found in the collinear category of our task. With the presence of ambiguity, an 305 observer will not be able to achieve perfect performance even when sensory noise is 306 completely absent. Shapes defined by illusory contours such as variants of the Kanizsa 307 triangle were previously used to study representations of illusory contours in the cortical 308 areas of the brain in functional imaging [36, 37] , rendering them potential candidates for 309 stimuli that can incorporate both ambiguity and sensory uncertainty.
310
Nevertheless, by studying the role of sensory uncertainty alone, our study presents a 311 more careful account of Bayesian inference in perceptual organization. In particular, we 312 compared the Bayesian observer model against other observer models that each describe 313 an alternative plausible decision strategy. We were able to distinguish a fixed stimulus 314 mapping that mimics Bayesian inference from probabilistic computation, which requires 315 the observer to flexibly adjust their decision boundary according to sensory uncertainty. 316 Despite evidence for probabilistic computations, we found that data was better 317 explained by a non-Bayesian heuristic model.
318
A possible explanation for subjects' heuristic strategy, which differed slightly but 319 systematically from optimal performance, might be that they had received insufficient 320 training. While we found no evidence of learning across sessions, it is possible that generate sensory data in an unsupervised fashion, a procedure that provides a plausible 335 account for visual cortical processing [38, 39] . Notably, such stochastic hierarchical 336 generative model was used to show that visual numerosity -a higher-order feature -can 337 be invariantly encoded in the deepest hidden layer of the neural network [40] , and could 338 analogously give rise to illusory contours neurons as found in monkeys [38] . extensions [42, 43] for MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA).
367
On each trial, a dark gray occluder (23 cd/m 2 ) with a width of 5.6 degrees of visual 368 angle (dva) was displayed against a light gray background (50 cd/m 2 ). A white
369
(159 cd/m 2 ) fixation dot 0.24 dva in diameter was shown in the lower central part of the 370 occluder; this dot corresponded to a retinal eccentricity of 0 dva. The stimuli consisted 371 of two horizontal white line segments on both sides of the occluder. The line segments 372 were all 5.6 dva in width and 0.16 dva in height. The vertical "base position" y of a pair 373 of line segments had one of four levels of retinal eccentricity (0, 4.8, 9.6, and 16.8 dva). 374 Trial procedure 375 Subjects completed two tasks, which we call collinearity judgment task and height 376 judgment task. On each trial in the collinearity judgment task (Fig 1A) , the occluder 377 and fixation dot were displayed for 850 ms, followed by the stimulus for 100 ms. On a 378 "non-collinear" trial, the vertical positions of the two line segments were independently 379 drawn from a normal distribution centered at one of the four "base" eccentricity levels 380 (0, 4.8, 9.6, or 16.8 dva), with a standard deviation of 0.48 dva (Fig 1E) ; on a "collinear" 381 trial, we drew the vertical position of the line segment on one side and matched the line 382 segment on the other side. In each session, 50% of the trials were "collinear" and 50% 383 were "non-collinear", randomly interleaved. At stimulus offset, the fixation dot turned 384 green to prompt the subject to indicate whether the two line segments were collinear.
385
The participant pressed one of 8 keys, corresponding to 8 choice-confidence 386 combinations, ranging from high-confident collinear to high-confident non-collinear.
387
Response time was not constrained. No performance feedback was given at the end of 388 the trial.
389
Height judgment task trials followed the same procedure (Fig 1B) , except that the 390 subject was asked to report which of the two line segments was highest ("left" or 391 "right"). We generated the line segments in the same fashion as in the "non-collinear" 392 condition of the collinearity judgment task. Audio feedback was given after each 393 response to indicate whether the choice was correct.
394
For the analyses described in this paper, we only considered choice data 395 ("collinear/non-collinear", "left/right"), leaving analysis of confidence reports to future 396 work.
397
Experiment procedure
398
During each session, subjects completed one height judgment task block, followed by 399 three collinearity judgment task blocks, and finished with another height judgment task 400 block. Each height judgment task block consisted of 60 trials, and each collinearity used in the experiment. For the collinearity judgment task, we computed the proportion 417 of trials in which subjects reported "collinear" at each offset bin and retinal eccentricity 418 level. For the height judgment task, we computed the proportion of trials in which 419 subjects reported "right higher" at each offset bin and retinal eccentricity level.
420
Repeated-measures ANOVA with offset bin and eccentricity level as within-subjects 421 factors were performed separately on the proportion of reporting "collinear" in the 422 collinearity judgment task and the proportion of reporting "right higher" in the height 423 judgment task. We applied Greenhouse-Geisser correction of the degrees of freedom in 424 order to account for deviations from sphericity [44] , and report effect sizes as partial eta 425 squared, denoted with η 
426
For all analyses the criterion for statistical significance was p < .05, and we report 427 uncorrected p-values. Unless specified otherwise, summary statistics are reported in the 428 text as mean ± SEM between subjects. Note that we used the summary statistics 429 described in this section only for visualization and to perform simple descriptive 430 statistics; all models were fitted to raw trial data as described next.
431
Model fitting
432
For each model and subject, the noise parameters σ 2 x (y) for y = 0, 4.8, 9.6 and 16.8 dva 433 were fitted as individual parameters.
434
We calculated the log likelihood of each individual dataset for a given model with (2) where the response probability p θ,model (Ĉ i |y Li , y Ri , σ 2 x (y i )) is defined in S1 Appendix.
437
We fitted the models by drawing samples from the unnormalized log posterior 438 distribution of the parameters p(θ|data) using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (parallel slice 439 sampling [30, 45] ) for each subject. The posterior distribution of the parameters is 440 proportional to the sum of data likelihood (Eq 3) and a factorized prior over the each 441 parameter j, 442 log p(θ|data, model) = log p(data|θ, model) + j log p(θ j |model) + const.
We used log-transformed coordinates for scale parameters (e.g., noise), and for all 443 parameters we assumed a uniform non-informative prior (uniform in log space for scale 444 parameters) [46] , within reasonably large bounds. Three parallel chains were ran with 445 starting point set at maximum likelihood point estimates of the parameters, evaluated 446 with Bayesian Adaptive Direct Search [47] , to ensure that the chains were initialized 447 within a high posterior density region.
448
After running all chains, we computed Gelman and Rubin's potential scale reduction 449 statistic R for all parameters to check for convergence [48] . An R value that diverges 
456
To visualize model fits (or posterior predictions) in Fig 4 and 5 , we computed the 457 posterior mean model prediction for each subject based on 60 independent samples from 458 the posterior (equally spaced in the sampled chains). We then plotted average and 459 standard deviation across subjects.
460
Model comparison
461
To estimate the predictive accuracy of the models while taking into account model 462 complexity, we compared models using the leave-one-out cross-validation score (LOO). 463 Leave-one-out cross-validation is a model evaluation technique in which all but one trial 464 of a dataset is used as training set to make prediction on the left-out trial using the 465 fitted model. This process is repeated until all trials have been iterated through. For 466 the purpose of computational efficiency, we estimate the leave-one-out cross validation 467 score via Pareto smoothed importance sampling [22] , which uses samples from the 468 posterior distribution of the parameters θ,
where θ k is the k-th posterior sample for the corresponding model and w i,k is the 470 importance weight of trial i for sample k. 
